

Security & Cryptographic Methods

PacNOG 6

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Reminder: Core Security Principals

What are they?

(1)-- **C**onfidentiality

(2)-- **I**ntegrity

(3)-- **A**uthentication

- Access Control
- Verification

(4)-- **A**vailability


What We'll Cover

- Digital signatures
- TLS/SSL
- SSH
- PGP




When encrypting (review):

Use a symmetric cipher with a random key (the "session key"). Use a public key cipher to encrypt the session key and send it along with the encrypted document.



When authenticating (review):

Take a hash of the document and encrypt only that. An encrypted hash is called a "digital signature"



Digital Signatures have many uses, for example:

- E-commerce. An instruction to your bank to transfer money can be authenticated with a digital signature. Legislative regimes are slow to catch up
- A trusted third party can issue declarations such as "the holder of this key is a person who is legally known as Alice Hacker"
Like a passport binds your identity to your face
- Such a declaration is called a "certificate"
- You only need the third-party's public key to check the signature


Do public keys *really* solve the key distribution problem?

- Often we want to communicate securely with a remote party whose key we don't know
- We can retrieve their public key over the network
- But what if there's someone in between intercepting our traffic?




The "man-in-the-middle" Attack

- Passive sniffing is no problem
- But if they can modify packets, they can substitute a different key
- The attacker uses separate encryption keys to talk to both sides
- You think your traffic is secure, but it isn't!



TLS/SSL – Digital Certificates



Digital Certificates can solve the man-in-the-middle problem

- **Problem:** I have no prior knowledge of the remote side's key, so cannot tell if a different one has been substituted
- But maybe someone else does
- A trusted third party can vouch for the remote side by signing a certificate which contains the remote side's name & public key
- I can check the validity of the certificate using the trusted third party's public key

Example: TLS (SSL) web server with digital certificate

- I generate a private key on my webserver
- I send my public key plus my identity (my webserver's domain name) to a certificate authority (CA)
- The CA manually checks that I am who I say I am, i.e. I own the domain
- They sign a certificate containing my public key, my domain name, and an expiration date
- I install the certificate on my web server

When a client's web browser connects to me using HTTPS:

- They negotiate an encrypted session with me, during which they learn my public key
- I send them the certificate
- They verify the certificate using the CA's public key, which is built-in to the browser
- If the signature is valid, the domain name in the URL matches the domain name in the certificate, and the expiration date has not passed, they know the connection is secure
 - (Q: why is there an expiration date?)

The security of TLS depends on:

- ✓ Your webserver being secure
 - So nobody else can obtain your private key
- ✓ The CA's public key being in all browsers
- ✓ The CA being well managed
 - How carefully do they look after their own private keys?
- ✓ The CA being trustworthy
 - Do they vet all certificate requests properly?
 - Could a hacker persuade the CA to sign their key pretending to be someone else? What about a government?
 - Do you trust them? Why?

Testing TLS (SSL) Applications

There is an equivalent of telnet you can use:

```
openssl s_client
```

It opens a TCP connection, negotiates TLS, then lets you type data

```
$ openssl s_client -connect nsrc.org:443
```

```
CONNECTED(00000003)
```

```
depth=1 /C=US/ST=Washington/L=Bainbridge Island/O=RGnet/PSGnet/OU= \
```

```
Engineering/CN=RGnet Root CA/emailAddress=randy@psg.com
```

```
verify error:num=19:self signed certificate in certificate chain
```

```
verify return:0
```

```
...  
New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
```

```
...
```

And, at the end you see:

```
Verify return code: 19 (self signed certificate in certificate chain)
```

Limitations of s_client

Works only for protocols which use TLS from the very beginning of the connection

- These protocols are identified by using a different port number to the non-encrypted version

(HTTP port 80), HTTPS port 443

(POP3 port 110), POP3S port 995

Other protocols start unencrypted and then "upgrade" the connection to encrypted on request

- e.g. SMTP has a "STARTTLS" command
- s_client is not usable for these

SSH



SSH Uses a Simple Solution to man-in-the-middle

- The first time you connect to a remote host, remember its public key
Stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts
- The next time you connect, if the remote key is different, then maybe an attacker is intercepting the connection!
 - Or maybe the remote host has just got a new key, e.g. after a reinstall. But it's up to you to resolve the problem
- Relies on there being no attack in progress the *first* time you connect to a machine
- Connect on LAN *before* travelling with laptop

SSH Can Eliminate Passwords

- Use public-key cryptography to prove who you are
- Generate a public/private key pair locally
`ssh-keygen -t rsa`
Private key is `~/.ssh/id_rsa`
Public key is `~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub`
- Install your PUBLIC key on remote hosts
`mkdir ~/.ssh`
`chmod 755 ~/.ssh`
Copy public key into `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`
- Login!

Notes on SSH Authentication

- Private key is protected by a passphrase
 - So you have to give it each time you log in
 - Or use "ssh-agent" which holds a copy of your passphrase in RAM
- No need to change passwords across dozens of machines
- Disable passwords entirely!
 - /etc/ssh/sshd_config
- There are currently two different types of SSH keys in use:
 - SSH2 DSA, SSH2 RSA
 - (SSH1 RSA is deprecated)

PGP/GPG – Pretty Good Privacy




PGP Takes a Different View

- We don't trust anyone except our friends (especially not big corporate monopolies)
- You sign your friends' keys to vouch for them
- Other people can choose to trust your signature as much as they trust you
- Generates a distributed "web of trust"
- Sign someone's key when you meet them face to face - "PGP key signing parties"

Summary

Designing a Good Cryptosystem is Very Difficult

- Many possible weaknesses and types of attack, often not obvious
- DON'T design your own!
- DO use expertly-designed cryptosystems which have been subject to widespread scrutiny
- Understand how they work and where the potential weaknesses are
- Remember the other weaknesses in your systems, especially the human ones, speaking of which...



DEBIAN

YOU CAN NEVER BE SURE.

The following code was removed from md_rand.c on Debian:

```
MD_Update(&m,buf,j);  
          [ .. ]  
MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
```

The end result was disastrous...


```
int getRandomNumber()  
{  
    return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll.  
              // guaranteed to be random.  
}
```

DEBIAN

GUARANTEED ENTROPY.

This was a human issue, and a subtle one at that. More information is here:

<http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/>

Where can you apply these cryptographic methods?

At the link layer

PPP encryption

At the network layer

IPSEC, IPv6

At the transport layer

TLS (SSL): many applications support it

At the application layer

SSH: system administration, file transfers

PGP/GPG: for securing E-mail messages, stand-alone documents, software packages etc.

Tripwire (and others): system integrity checks

Start Using Cryptography Now!

- Use [ssh](#) for remote administration.
- Use [scp/sftp](#) for files transfer (except public ftp repositories).
- Install [pop3/imap/smtp](#) servers [with tls](#) support.
Phase out the use of non-tls version.
- Use [https](#) for any web application where users enter passwords or confidential data
 - e.g. webmail, databases, wikis, nagios, cacti

Any questions?