### **Security introduction**

Brian Candler Presented by Hervey Allen

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# **Main Security Concerns**

#### Confidentiality

Keeping our data safe from prying eyes

#### Integrity

Protecting our data from loss or unauthorised alteration

#### **Authentication and Authorisation**

Is this person who they claim to be? Is this person allowed to do this?

#### Availability

Are our systems working when we need them? (Denial of Service, backups, proper configs)

Security Implications of connecting to the Internet The Internet lets you connect to millions of hosts but they can also connect to you!

Many points of access (e.g. telephone, cybercafes, wireless nets, university, work...) Even if you can trace an attack to a point on the Internet, the real source may be untraceable Many "0wned" machines or "bots" from which further attacks are launched

Your host runs many Internet services Many potential points of vulnerability Many servers run as "root"! (buffer overflows)

### **Network-based attacks**

#### **Passive attacks**

e.g. packet sniffers, traffic analysis

#### **Active attacks**

e.g. connection hijacking, IP source spoofing, exploitation of weaknesses in IP stack or applications (e.g. Internet Explorer)

#### **Denial of Service attacks** e.g. synflood

#### Attacks against the network itself e.g. smurf

### **Other common attacks**

- Brute-force and Dictionary attacks (password guessing, password too complex)
- Viruses
- Spyware
- Trojan horses
- Humans are often the weakest link "Hi, this is Bob, what's the root password?" Opening infected E-mails

#### **Authentication: Passwords**

- Can be guessed
- If too complex, users tend to write them down
- If sent unencrypted, can be "sniffed" from the network and re-used (pop, imap, telnet, webmail)

# **Choosing good passwords**

Combinations of upper and lower-case letters, numbers and symbols 'brute force' attacker has to try many more combinations

Not in any dictionary, including hackers dictionaries

\$40&yc4f "Money for nothing and your chicks for free"

wsR!vst? "workshop students aRe not very sleepy today ?"

# Authentication: Source IP address

Not verified by the network (since not used in datagram delivery)

Datagrams are easily forged

TCP 3-way handshake gives some degree of protection, as long as you can't guess TCP sequence numbers Legitimate example: controlling SMTP relaying by source IP address

Any UDP protocol is completely vulnerable e.g. NFS

#### **Authentication: Host name**

Very weak

DNS is easily attacked (e.g. by loading false information into cache)

Slight protection by ensuring that reverse and forward DNS matches e.g. Connection received from 80.248.72.254 Lookup 80.248.72.254 -> noc.ws.afnog.org Lookup noc.ws.afnog.org -> 80.248.72.254

This is why many sites won't let you connect unless your forward and reverse matches

# **Cryptographic methods**

- Can provide REALLY SECURE solutions to authentication, privacy and integrity
- Some are hard to implement, many different tools, usually requires special clients
- Export and usage restrictions (less of a problem these days)
- Take care to understand where the weaknesses lie

# **Simple combinations**

- The lock on your front door can be picked
- Two locks are better than one
- The thief is more likely to try somewhere else

# IP source address AND password authentication

Most applications have password authentication, but some also include their own IP-based access controls

Some applications link to "libwrap" (also known as "tcp wrappers") /etc/hosts.allow All services which are started by inetd are covered

For info and examples: man 5 hosts\_access

### **Most essential steps**

- Disable all services which are not needed
- Apply security patches promptly; join the announcement mailing lists
- Good password management
- Take special care with 'root' access
- Combine passwords with IP access controls where appropriate
- Use cryptographic tools where possible

# And don't forget these...

Make sure you have current backups! How else will you recover from a break-in?

Make sure your machine is physically secure! If someone can walk off with the machine, they can walk off with your data

#### Log files are valuable!

May want to consider software which watches them, e.g. swatch, logwatch, logsurfer: tail -f /var/log/messages http://www.nsrc.org/security/#logging

### More advanced steps

- Scan your machines from outside nmap, nessus
- Firewalls apply policy at the network edge assert control at a small number of places very difficult to build a really GOOD firewall of your own not effective if your own users violate security (by downloading viruses, for example)
- Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
- **Token-based** authentication

## **UNDERSTAND** what you're doing

A bad security solution is worse than no security at all

Know what you're doing Read all the documentation Read sample configurations Build test machines Ask questions Join the announcements mailing list for your O/S and applications

Test what you've done Try connecting from outside your network Try circumventing your own rules

# Some helpful guides

- The FreeBSD handbook at www.freebsd.org Chapter 14 on security
- "Practical Unix & Internet Security" (O'Reilly)
- http://nsrc.org/security/
- Security alert mailing lists, including: http://www.securityfocus.com/ ("Bugtraq") http://www.cert.org/ http://www.rootshell.com/